

REPORT OF FATALITY
HAULAGE ACCIDENT
UNDERGROUND COAL MINE

JUNE 4, 2018

CARTER ROAG COAL COMPANY
MORGAN CAMP MINE
PERMIT #U00201297

REGION ONE
14 COMMERCE DRIVE, SUITE ONE
WESTOVER, WEST VIRGINIA 26501
EDWARD PEDDICORD, INSPECTOR-AT-LARGE

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
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
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
ACCIDENT LOCATION



788 Wallace Diesel Powered Personnel Carrier/Operator Side




788 Wallace Diesel Powered Personnel Carrier/Passenger Side





TIMELINE 06/04/2018 – 06/05/2018



GENERAL INFORMATION

The Carter Roag Coal Company, Morgan Camp Mine, Permit No. U00201297 is a drift mine which produces coal in the Sewell seam. The mine is located near Helvetia on Route 46, Helvetia-Adolph Road, Randolph County, West Virginia. The Morgan Camp Mine employs 115 miners and opened in October of 2017. The mine produces approximately 2000 tons of raw coal daily from 2 super sections consisting of 4 continuous miner units. Coal is transported via conveyor belt to the surface located at the Morgan Camp Mine portal stockpile. Employees and supplies are transported by diesel and battery powered, rubber tired equipment. This mine operates 3, nine hour shifts. Day and afternoon are production shifts and midnight shift performs maintenance.

DESCRIPTION

On June 5, 2018, at 12:31 a.m., Kelvin Napier, Safety Manager, notified John Meadows, Assistant Inspector-At-Large of the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety & Training that a serious accident had occurred at the Carter Roag Coal Company, Morgan Camp Mine in Randolph County. West Virginia State Mine Inspectors Nathan Sharp, Ward Colvin and Jeffrey Bennett were instructed by Mr. Meadows to go directly to the mine. West Virginia State Mine Inspector Allen Nestor arrived at the Morgan Camp Mine initially for a diesel inspection and assisted with the investigation. Written statements from eye witnesses and an on-site inspection of the accident scene revealed that Ronald Taylor, Shuttle Car Operator, was traveling to the surface with the West Mains coal loading crew in a diesel powered personnel carrier. Mr. Ronald Taylor received serious injuries to his head and face when the personnel carrier struck a metal Heintzmann screw jack that was lying on the mine floor.

On June 4, 2018, at 3:15 p.m., the afternoon shift, West Mains coal loading crew began their shift at the Morgan Camp Mine. According to testimonies, it was revealed that at the start of the shift, rubber tired personnel carriers were stuck/immobilized in the No. 4 entry, between No. 2 and No. 3 crosscuts. Excessive mud/debris was allowed to accumulate in the roadway, resulting in excessive ruts and leaving the personnel carriers high centered. During this shift, Joshua Mathews, Shift Foreman, was cleaning the haulage roadway with a battery powered scoop, in the No. 4 entry, primarily between the No. 2 and No. 4 crosscuts. Mr. Mathews made several trips to the surface with the battery powered scoop to unload material. Mr. Mathews transported gravel from the surface, returned underground and placed it in the affected area.

At the end of this afternoon shift, the following individuals were being transported to the surface in the No. 788 Wallace, diesel powered, rubber tired personnel carrier; 1. Zachariah Wright - West Mains Section Foreman; 2. Ronald Taylor - Shuttle Car operator; 3. Zachary Haddix - Utilityman; 4. Nicholas Woods - Continuous Miner Operator; 5. Justin Pritt - Roof Bolter operator; 6. Thomas Grey - Roof Bolter Operator; 7. William Haddox - Shuttle Car Operator. Mr. Wright was operating the personnel carrier and Mr. Taylor was riding in the front, single seat, passenger side. When the personnel carrier was in the No. 4 entry, just outby the No. 3 crosscut, it struck a metal Heintzmann screw jack lying on the mine floor. Based upon physical conditions observed at the accident site, it is believed the jack had been previously dislodged from the outby end of the king beam located on the left corner in the No. 4 entry, outby No. 3 crosscut.

When the personnel carrier struck the bottom part of the jack, it was forced/propelled upward striking Mr. Taylor in the head. The jack then continued to travel airborne, across the personnel carrier, also striking the operator, Mr. Wright on the right forearm. Mr. Wright immediately stopped the personnel carrier and assessed the situation with the assistance of fellow employees. Mr. Taylor was momentarily unconscious with head and facial injuries. Mr. Wright immediately informed others of this accident and requested additional assistance to the accident site. Miners attended to Mr. Taylor and he was secured to a backboard and transported on an awaiting battery powered, rubber tired personnel carrier to the surface. Mr. Taylor was then carried to a mine office trailer located on the surface. Mr. Taylor was coherent while being attended to by miners and EMTs.

At 12:36 a.m., Randolph County EMS arrived on scene and Mr. Taylor was placed in their care. At 2:35 a.m., Mr. Taylor was transported by HealthNet helicopter to Ruby Memorial Hospital in Morgantown, West Virginia. Dr. Allen Mock pronounced Mr. Taylor deceased at 6:06 p.m., on June 5, 2018, due to injuries received in this accident.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Mr. Taylor was a Certified Underground Miner No. 1-16567.
2. Mr. Taylor was a Certified Mine Foreman No. 40817-14.
3. Mr. Taylor completed Mine Foreman Continuing Education Class on March 22, 2017.
4. Mr. Taylor received annual refresher training on January 20, 2018.
5. Mr. Taylor was assigned to the right side of the West Mains super section.
6. The battery powered personnel carriers at this mine have higher ground clearance than diesel powered personnel carriers.
7. At the start of the afternoon shift on June 4, 2018, a Mine Inspector from the Mine Safety and Health Administration issued a verbal safeguard on the No. 4 entry roadway, between No. 2 and No. 4 blocks. This safeguard was issued when he observed personnel carriers being stuck/immobilized while transporting dayshift miners to the outside and afternoon shift miners were traveling underground.
8. Toward the end of the shift, at approximately 11:39 p.m., Mr. Taylor and 6 crew members left the section on the No. 788 Wallace diesel personnel carrier and traveled toward the surface.
9. The first personnel carrier that left the West Mains section was battery powered and was the last personnel carrier to travel past 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ block prior to the accident. There were 8 miners from the West Mains crew on the battery powered personnel carrier.
10. The accident occurred at approximately 11:44 p.m., on June 4, 2018.
11. The accident occurred at No. 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ block in the No. 4 entry, 240 feet from the surface.
12. The average width in the accident area between the ribs is 17.5 feet.
13. The average width between the Heintzmann jacks in this area is 16.5 feet.
14. The Heintzmann screw jack has a capacity rating of 50 tons. The jack is a two piece system. The top piece is equipped with a bracket on top that fits against the bottom and sides of the overhead beam. The bottom of this bracket is attached to an all thread solid pipe. This all thread solid pipe is screwed into a large nut with handles on each side to raise and lower the jack. The bottom of this large nut also serves as a collar to secure the bottom piece. The bottom piece is a hollow pipe that measured 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter and 54 $\frac{3}{4}$ inches in length. An 8 inch square piece of metal is welded to the bottom of this pipe that serves as a footer.
15. The impression on the bottom of the king beam where the jack was dislodged revealed that the jack was struck from the outby end and fell inby. The top

- piece of the Heintzmann screw jack measured 7' in by from where it was originally positioned.
16. The overhead I beams and the Heintzmann screw jacks were installed on 4 foot centers during initial development.
 17. No employees testified that they observed a Heintzmann screw jack lying in the haulage road prior to the accident.
 18. The No. 788 Wallace personnel carrier is an open type carrier.
 19. The No. 788 Wallace personnel carrier has model No. D U V 13-2-111 with WV approval No. WV 06 – 101TAC2T.
 20. The No. 788 Wallace personnel carrier was put into service on April 25, 2018.
 21. The front of the No. 788 Wallace personnel carrier measures 6.5 feet wide.
 22. The rear of the No. 788 Wallace personnel carrier measures 7.5 feet wide.
 23. On a level surface the ground clearance from the ground to the bottom of the empty No. 788 Wallace personnel carrier measured 5 ½ inches at the front passenger seat.
 24. From the outside of the passenger side tires to the outside of the passenger side of the personnel carrier measured 8 inches.
 25. The No. 788 Wallace personnel carrier was being operated in 2nd gear at the time of the accident.
 26. The No. 788 Wallace personnel carrier can only be operated in 1st and/or 2nd gear, forward or reverse. Third gear is not operational and intentionally disabled.
 27. A post-accident inspection of the No. 788 Wallace diesel personnel carrier was conducted on June 5, 2018 and no defects were detected or recorded.
 28. The Preshift Mine Examiner's report conducted on June 4, 2018 from 8:00 p.m., to 9:32 p.m., for the haulage roads on the afternoon shift for the midnight shift, was recorded "3 to 4 Blk Bad Roads". This was recorded after the issuance of the MSHA safeguard.
 29. The Carter Roag Coal Company, Morgan Camp Mine uses the IWT tracking system.
 30. Formal interviews were conducted at the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety & Training, Region One Westover Office on June 13, 2018.

CONCLUSION

Evidence indicates when Mr. Taylor was traveling towards the surface on the No. 788 Wallace personnel carrier at 2 ¾ block in the No. 4 entry, the personnel carrier struck the bottom section of a Heintzmann screw jack. Evidence indicated that the jack was lying on the mine floor and had been dislodged from its original position. Mr. Taylor received blunt force injuries of the head when the jack was forced/propelled upward and struck Mr. Taylor.

ENFORCEMENT ACTION

Order

A non-assessed order was issued in accordance with West Virginia Title 36, Series 19, Section 7.1 to preserve evidence until an investigation by the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety & Training is completed.

Violation #1 - Chapter 22A, Article 2, Section 25(b)

During the investigation of the fatal accident of Ronald Taylor, which occurred on June 4, 2018, evidence indicated that the operator failed to promptly replace the Heintzmann screw jack as required. The jack had been dislodged from the outby end of the king beam located on the left corner in the No. 4 entry, outby No. 3 crosscut. Mr. Taylor received fatal injuries when he was a passenger on the No. 788 Wallace diesel powered personnel carrier that was traveling towards the surface from the West Mains section. The personnel carrier struck the bottom section of the jack that was lying in the roadway. The jack was forced/propelled upward, striking Mr. Taylor in the head. The jack continued to travel airborne, striking the operator on the right forearm. The accident occurred at No. 2 ¾ block in the No. 4 entry, 240 feet from the surface. There was a total of 7 miners being transported on this personnel carrier. This was a violation of a health or safety provision and was of a serious nature resulting in a fatality.

Violation #2 - Chapter 22A, Article 2, Section 25(a)

During the investigation of the fatal accident of Ronald Taylor, which occurred on June 4, 2018, evidence indicated that the approved roof control plan is not being complied with. Three of the Heintzmann screw jacks that are required to be installed under both ends of the overhead I beams that extend across the entry were dislodged/missing in the No. 4 entry roadway. Eighteen of the Heintzmann screw jacks in the No. 4 entry roadway were not properly secured resulting in inadequate roof support. The No. 4 entry is used for transportation of miners and supplies.

Violation #3 - Chapter 22A, Article 2, Section 20(a)

During the investigation of the fatal accident of Ronald Taylor, which occurred on June 4, 2018, physical evidence and testimonies revealed that prior to issuance of the MSHA safeguard, the preshift and onshift examinations were not competently or adequately conducted of the No. 4 entry haulage road area. Personnel carriers transporting day shift miners to the surface and transporting afternoon shift miners underground were stuck/immobilized in the No. 4 entry haulage road between No. 2 and No. 3 crosscuts. Excessive mud/debris was allowed to

accumulate in the roadway, resulting in excessive ruts and leaving the personnel carries high centered. Three of the Heintzmann screw jacks that were once installed under both ends of the overhead I beams that extend across the entry were dislodged/missing in the No. 4 entry roadway. Eighteen of these jacks in the No. 4 entry roadway were not properly secured resulting in inadequate roof support. The No. 4 entry is used for transportation of miners and supplies. The conditions listed above, were not recorded as required in the prescribed book.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Submitted by Carter Roag Coal Company

The below actions are being completed to improve the safety of primary haulage route.

1. "Prop Straps" manufactured by Jenmar are being installed on the roof-to-floor roof support (roof jacks) located in the #4 entry (secondary escapeway – main travelway) from the surface to block #7.

2. Drainage control (cattle crossing culvert) is being installed in the #4 entry at the pit mouth to help divert water away from the main travel route.

3. All travelways are being examined by certified examiners for haulage hazards and corrections completed as appropriate.

The Comprehensive Mine Safety Program shall be modified and include these recommendations as required by the Director.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety & Training gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of Carter Roag Coal Company, United Coal Company LLC and the Mine Safety and Health Administration during this investigation.

MINE INFORMATION

COMPANY Carter Roag Coal Company

MINE COMPANY Morgan Camp Mine

WV PERMIT # U00201297 MSHA PERMIT # 46-08656

ADDRESS 14272 Adolph Road, Mill Creek, WV 26280

COUNTY Randolph PHONE NO. 304-924-6757

DATE PERMIT ISSUED 2017

WORKING STATUS Active

LOCATION 11.3 Miles from Helvetia, WV

UNION _____ NON-UNION X

DAILY PRODUCTION 2000 Tons ANNUAL PRODUCTION TO DATE 332,350 Raw YTD

TOTAL EMPLOYEES 115

NUMBER OF SHIFTS 3

COAL SEAM NAME AND THICKNESS Sewell 38 inches to 60 inches

ACCIDENT INCIDENT RATE 2.06% NFDL Rate LOST TIME ACCIDENTS 1

TYPE OF HAULAGE Battery & Diesel Rubber Tired

WVOMHST INSPECTOR Nathan Sharp

DATE OF LAST INSPECTION May 31, 2018

NOTIFIED BY Kelvin Napier

NOTIFICATION TIME 12:31 a.m., June 5, 2018

CMSP-ANNIVERSARY DATE October 25, 2018

CMSP-CONTACT PERSON Kelvin Napier